Take a walk around the typical U.S. industrial facility. You may see an employees’ entrance controlled by electronic access control or a security officer. The visitors’ entrance may be monitored by a receptionist or CCTV. It appears, at first glance, that the plant is secure.
But take a walk around the building. Check out the loading dock area. Chances are, you’ll find pedestrian or overhead doors in that area which are open or unlocked, and through which you can easily enter if you smile and look like you belong. Now continue your walk and check out the building’s perimeter doors, most often side doors not used for regular entry and exit. It will be likely, especially if the weather’s hot, that you’ll find doors propped open for ventilation, catching a smoke, or easy (unmonitored) access to the parking lots. Go through the open door and walk through the plant, as we have on many occasions, and most likely you won’t be stopped, questioned or reported. Wander into high risk areas such as control rooms, research and development, raw or finished material storage, mixing rooms, executive offices, warehouses, chemical storage, etc. and most people will assume you must somehow belong and will allow you to move freely.
The average industrial facility is poorly secured not because the company hasn’t made a commitment to security nor because there is no budget for security, but because faulty assumptions have been made by both management and employees. It is difficult to see the forest for the trees, and it is easy to feel a sense of accomplishment when the guards are in place, the CCTV cameras are installed, and the alarm system is being monitored. The problem is that the security program hasn’t taken into account the normal function of the facility, the attitudes and perceptions of the employees, and the true vulnerabilities of the operation. Employees assume that security is the responsibility of management and ends at the gates and main entrances. To them, convenience and comfort take precedence over protection. To the supervisors, productivity and labor harmony are more critical than good security. Management assumes that strong safety awareness implies positive security awareness, and often believes that further security restrictions may cause a rash of grievances and reduced morale.
And so, the doors remain accessible and the employees continue undermining the security program. Until, of course, the major theft, sabotage, contamination or workplace violence incident happens; and then over-reaction and overspending become the rule as lawsuits spread, morale slumps, stock value plummets, and fingers are pointed.
So, what to do? How can an industrial facility, whether manufacturer, food processor, refinery or warehouse, more efficiently, effectively and consistently assure a practical and prudent level of security? How can employees become part of the security program rather than an impediment to it? And what can be done about those doors?
First, consider conducting an objective assessment of your facility. While an outside consultant or corporate security manager can be useful to advise and facilitate such a process, I have found putting together a team of key plant and corporate staff and employees to work through the process together can be a very powerful and constructive method. In such an assessment, the team would consider critical assets and targets, various possible scenarios of attack and other wrongdoing, potential consequences, existing layers and rings of protection, attractiveness to attack or other compromise, potential adversaries, and would evaluate existing and planned procedural and physical countermeasures.
It will be critical to look at your plant with new eyes. You and other staff are intimately familiar with the facility and its operation, and it’s often difficult to see past that familiarity to recognize vulnerable areas and issues. It can be useful to include a trusted hourly employee in your considerations, because he or she can often lend a perspective very different than that of management.
Then, talk to your people. Employees will not take a role in security if they’re not trained and motivated in it. Every employee should understand that he or she is responsible for the protection of their work area and for the security and safety of fellow employees, visitors, contractors, and others legitimately within the facility. They should be told that stealing is wrong - you can’t assume they appreciate that. They should understand that they are responsible to politely question or report persons whom they don’t recognize and who don’t have proper identification or escort. And they should know they have a duty to report others who act unsafely, in an unstable manner, or who make veiled or actual threats. In virtually all workplace violence incidents, there were people who knew the attacker and heard him or her make threats or other disturbing comments, and yet nobody spoke up. There is a natural aversion to “squealing,” and employees should understand that their speaking up about a concern they have with a fellow employee is not “ratting” on them, but may get them help and avoid a tragic consequence. We have repeatedly found that employees, including union members, are much more accepting of new security measures since 9/11. They watch the news, too, and know that they may need to be a bit more inconvenienced to protect themselves and others.
But what about those doors? Often the most contentious security-related issue is the consistent closing and securing of perimeter pedestrian and overhead doors. The argument will be made how necessary open doors are to ventilation and comfort, and yet such doors provide an improper access point and often an aid to internal theft. In many cases, I have found that deployment of the scissors-type steel folding security gates on designated pedestrian and overhead doors allow the desired ventilation (and view outside) while restricting unauthorized access or egress. The use of these gates sends the signal that the company is serious about its security, but understanding of the needs of its employees. These folding security gates have been around for years and their design has been proven to be durable. They are inexpensive and easy for a plant maintenance employee to install.
Good security is a careful and strategic balance between control and convenience. No security program will be at all effective unless it is supported and understood by all who are affected by it, including employees, and unless it properly addresses all risks and vulnerabilities. Sometimes it takes a creative compromise to get it all done.
Dick Sem is President of Sem Security Management, a security consulting firm based in the Chicago area. www.SemSecuritv.com
Tim Detwiler is a principal with Wholesale Gate Co., a manufacturer of steel folding security gates. Wholesale Gate Co. has manufactured security gates for over 35 years and distributes them all over the US and Canada. Their product line can be seen at www.WholesaleGate.com or www.SecurityGateCo.com
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